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I. Introduction
Depreciation is one of the important factors affecting firms’ investment decisions, as it is
deducted from a gross stream of return generated from an asset when calculating tax
profits. Apart from straight-line depreciation, various types of tax depreciation are allowed
in many countries at present, which generally aim to encourage firms’ investment activity
(Sinn, 1987; King, 1977; King and Fullerton, 1984; Sandmo, 1974; Jacobs and Spengel,
1996; Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten, 1999). For example, accelerated depreciation
has been applied in Finland to stimulate private investment. Besides, geometric-degressive
depreciation has been popular in EU countries like France, Spain and Sweden. In Austria,
investment tax allowance (Investitionsfreibetrag) can be adopted as an ‘indirect’
investment promotion scheme at present. In assessing their relative generosity, a useful
benchmark is that of Samuelson’s true economic depreciation (TED). This depreciation
provision is neutral with respect to investment decisions (Samuelson, 1964; Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1980).
The incentive effects of different tax depreciation rules combined with the corporate tax
rate on firms’ investment decisions can be compared on the basis of the so-called net
present value model (Wagner and Dirrigl, 1980; Schaden, 1994). Without taxation, the net
present value (NPV) is equal to the present value of future gross return, discounted at an
appropriate interest rate which corresponds to an expected minimum acceptable rate of
return less the present value of the cost of investment. An investment project is therefore
considered to be profitable when the NPV is positive.
2 After the introduction of corporate
tax, the present value of an asset generated from an investment amounts to the sum of
present value of net return (gross return less taxes) and tax savings led by an incentive
depreciation provision. If the investment is self-financed, the interest rate directly
corresponds to the investor’s opportunity cost. Under the assumption of a perfect
competitive market structure, there exists only an interest rate in the financial market.
In addition, anticipated effects of inflation on firms’ investment decisions are examined
in the context of corporate income taxation. The central issue is that the so-called
historical cost accounting method, which is applied in practice when calculating the
(corporate or income) tax base, causes fictitious profits in inflationary phases that are also
                    
2 According to Pindyck (1991), the net present value criterion for investment no longer holds when: a)
future cash flows and interest rates are uncertain, b) investment expenditures are costly to reverse
(because, for example, many types of capital goods are specialised, indivisible, and it is often costly to
separate them from the production process) and c) firms have the latitude to delay investment
expenditures. “Under these conditions, an investment project undertaken today must compete with itself
[which will be carried out] at some future date and, as a result, the expected present value of profit from a
project must exceed the costs of the project plus the option value associated with more information.
Furthermore, the value of waiting rises when uncertainty rises so that increased uncertainty causes agents
to postpone irreversible investment expenditures” (Ferderer, 1993, p. 20).3
subject to tax. This type of increased tax burden is generally called inflation losses (Aaron,
1976; Feldstein, 1979; Streißler, 1982; Gonedes, 1984; Kay, 1977; Kopcke, 1981).
Therefore, in periods with inflation generous tax depreciation provisions do not adequately
promote private investment as designed, but only (or partly) compensate the losses caused
by inflation. To be sure, annual inflation rates have recently been quite low in advanced
OECD countries. Yet this study aims to suggest that the low inflation rate still matters.
II. Samuelson’s Tax Neutrality of True Economic Depreciation
Revisited
Under the assumption that
•   a (self-financed) investment costing C generates an infinite stream of future gross
return,
•   this return exponentially declines at the rate α  (0 < α  < 1)
3 and
•   all prices are constant over time (π  = 0),
the present value of the asset before taxation at time u* is:
                           ∞ A0e
–α u*
(1) PVu*  =  ∫  A0 e
–α u e
–r(u–u*) du  =  
                                       u*   α +r
where Au means gross return at time u and r is the real interest rate (0 < r < 1).
On the basis of such a simple net present value model, Samuelson (1964) showed in his
fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance that corporate income taxation does not affect
firms’ investment decisions at all when the true economic depreciation (TED) is deducted
from an expected gross stream of return generated from an asset when calculating tax
profits.
Taxation does not affect firms’ investment decisions if
(2) PVu*  =  PV(t)u*,
where PV(t)u* is the present value of asset after the introduction of corporate tax rate t at
time u*, discounted at r(1–t).
When equation (2) is applied, one can derive
                    
3 The assumption of declining gross return in the course of time is often made in practice, because it is
hardly possible to forecast the development of future profit. This type of assumption is more plausible
than the one with constant annual profit (Wagner and Dirrigl, 1980).4
dPVu*               dPV(t)u*
(3)     =     .
    du*                du*
Differentiating (1) with respect to u*
          dPVu*            –α A0e
-α u*
(4)     =       =  –α  PVu*  .
  du*              α +r
Consequently, tax neutrality is guaranteed when
       dPV(t)u*
(5) ————  =  –α PVu*   .
           du*
True economic depreciation (TED) is defined as the negative change in value of the asset
in the course of time. Therefore, the TED rate can be calculated as follows:
        TEDu*
(6) —–———  =  α ,
          PVu*
which is the same as the rate with which the gross return declines in the course of time.
4
Furthermore, if we have a TED function with respect to u, which also declines at the
rate α , then
(7) TEDu  =  α PV0e
–α u    .
In the case that TED is permitted as a tax-deductible depreciation expense,
                                ∞
(8) PV(t)u*  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–α ue
–r(1–t)(u–u*) du
                                u*
                              ∞
 +  t ∫  α  PV0 e
–α u e
–r(1–t)(u–u*) du
                              u*
                    
4 In the case of assuming a constant gross return function (α  = 0) with regard to time u, this model
automatically leads to the ‘unusual’ conclusion that the TED rate is zero. Furthermore, with an
exponentially ascending gross return function, the TED rate is unrealistically negative, which is
interpreted by Samuelson (1964) as the appreciation of asset value in the course of time.5
                            (1–t)A0 e
–α u*         tα PVu*
 =  —————  +  ————   =  PVu*
                              α +r(1–t)            α +r(1–t)
Thus, the condition shown in the equation (5) is also satisfied.
III. Effects of Various Tax Depreciation Rules on Investment Decision
Revealed in Present Value Model
In the practice of tax policy, different types of tax depreciation rules are employed which
do not typically ensure TED; furthermore, their generosity has been extended in order to
stimulate private investment. These tax depreciation measures are:
•   straight-line depreciation
•   geometric-degressive depreciation
•   accelerated depreciation
•   free depreciation
•   investment tax allowance.
In the absence of taxation an investment project is on the margin of acceptance at the
year of investment when
                      ∞                  A0
(9) C  =  PV0  =  ∫  A0e
–(α +r)u du  =  ———  .
                      0                        α +r.
In this case, the NPV is zero.
In the case of straight-line depreciation over Γ  years the amount of depreciation
expense of the period u is calculated
               C
(10) Du
sld  =  ——
                Γ
where u = 1, 2, ...... Γ .
As shown in (8), the introduction of a corporate tax rate t, with the discount rate
becoming r(1–t), does not affect PV0 if TED is deducted when calculating tax profits.
However, with straight-line depreciation6
       ∞                                 Γ
(11) PV(t)0
sld   =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du  +  t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
               0                                 0
                    A0            1–e
–r(1–t)Γ
                        α
   =  ——— + tC {————— – —————}
             α +r              r(1–t) Γ            α +r(1–t)
                                 α
    =  PV0 + tC {(DA) – —————}  .
                       α +r(1–t)
DA denotes the value of straight-line depreciation allowances per monetary unit like the
D-Mark or dollar (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
Consequently, the application of straight-line depreciation is advantageous when
                  α
(12) DA  >  ————  .
             α +r(1–t)
                    α
When DA  =  ————— there exists a critical Γ *.
                α +r(1–t)
For shorter tax-lives than Γ * straight-line depreciation gives more generous allowances.
The amount of geometric-degressive depreciation expense in the period u is measured
(13) Du
gdd  =  δ Ce
–δ u
where δ  is the geometric-degressive depreciation rate (0 < δ  < 1) and Ce
–δ u shows the net
book value of capital good in the period u.
With geometric-degressive depreciation the present value of asset at time 0 is
                               ∞                                      ∞
(14) PV(t)0
gdd  =  ∫  A0(1–t)e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + tC ∫  δ e
–{δ +r(1–t)}u du
                               0                                      0
                                              δ             α
   =  PV0 + tC {———— – ————}  .
                                        δ +r(1–t)      α +r(1–t)7
If δ  = α , PV(t)0
gdd = PV0 just as in the case with TED. If δ  > α , geometric-degressive
depreciation has incentive effects, which, in turn, means that PV(t)0
gdd > PV0.
Accelerated depreciation is used in practice as an investment promotion scheme only in
combination with straight-line depreciation method. Accelerated depreciation expense (as
a certain percentage share of investment cost) is tax-deductible in the first year of the tax-
life of a capital good.
5 Consequently, total depreciation expense in the first year reaches
                         C
(15) D1
ad+sld  =  σ C + ——
                     Γ
where σ  indicates the accelerated depreciation rate (0 < σ  < 1).
Because an extra amount of expense can be deducted in the first year, the total tax-life
of a capital good is reduced correspondingly from Γ  to Ω . And
(16) Ω   =  (1 – σ )Γ   .
With accelerated depreciation the present value of an asset at time 0 is
                                 ∞                             1
(17) PV(t)0
ad  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + t ∫  σ Ce
–r(1–t)u du
             0                                   0
       Ω
  + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
                              0
                                     σ {1–e
–r(1–t)}  
        1–e
–r(1–t)Ω         α
  =  PV0 + tC[————— + ————— – ————]  .
                                          r(1–t)              r(1–t)Γ         α +r(1–t)
PV(t)0
ad increases in accordance to the increase in σ . PV(t)0
ad reaches its maximum with σ
= 100%, namely in the case of applying free depreciation (Nam, 1995).
 6
Investment tax allowance is also generally used in combination with straight-line
depreciation. Unlike the case with accelerated depreciation, the total tax-life of a capital
                    
5  Apart from the extra financial resources released in the beginning of an asset life (the so-called liquidity
advantage), which can again be used for an additional investment in the future (Nam, 1995), accelerated
depreciation reduces uncertainties and risks linked to the investment, since the total tax-life of a capital
good is significantly shortened (Tichy, 1980).
6  At present the free depreciation method is allowed, for example, in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands
only for the so-called low-value equipment which costs less than 5,000 schilling, 8,400 krone and 2,000
guilder, respectively.8
good remains unchanged. As a consequence, this type of tax incentive provides
possibilities of depreciating the value, which is significantly higher than the original
investment cost of a capital good.
With investment tax allowance the present value of asset at time 0 is
                                          ∞                                1                                 Γ
(18) PV0
ita  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + t ∫  (β C)e
–r(1–t)u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
                                   0                              0                          0
                                    β {1–e
–r(1–t)}                          α
=  PV0 + tC{ ————— + (DA) – ——————}
                                        r(1–t)                        α +r(1–t)
where β  indicates the rate of investment tax allowance (0 < β  < 1).
IV. Consideration of the Fictitious Profit and the Inflation Losses in
Present Value Model
The size of fictitious profits and the additional corporate tax burden, which are caused by
the application of the historical accounting method in the inflationary phase, can also be
measured on the basis of the net present value model.
7 Such inflation losses lead to the
reduction of nominal net present value. More precisely, the amount of increased tax
burden caused by inflation can be described as the difference between the two nominal
PVs, one with depreciation measured on the basis of current value of a capital good and
the other with that determined on the basis of the historical accounting method.
In an economy with the constant inflation rate π , the stream of gross return which is
generated by an investment costing C at time u is
(19) Au = A0e
–α ue
π u = A0e
–(α –π )u   .
In this case, the sum of annual gross return exponentially decreases at the rate α  (0 < α  <
1) but increases at the rate π  in the course of time.
In the case of employing the historical accounting method, the nominal present value of
an asset with straight-line depreciation at time 0 is
                    
7  There have been a number of attempts to estimate the current value of a capital good on the basis of
indexation. “Such a method would provide for equitable accounting whether inflation rates were high or
low. [But] many agree that it would be too complicated to compute the rate of inflation for the multitude
of different assets. The idea of using an overall index was rejected on the grounds that some assets such as
computers actually [decline] in price over time and this method would bias investment towards those9
                            ∞                                Γ
(20) nPV(t)0
sld  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α –π +µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–{µ (1–t)}u du
                        0                                0
                      (1–t)A0              tC{1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ }
              =  —————— + ——————
                   α –π +µ (1–t)             µ (1–t)Γ
where µ  is the nominal interest rate (µ  = r+π ).
On the other hand, when depreciation expense is determined on the basis of current
investment cost, the nominal value of asset with the same depreciation method at time 0 is
                                  ∞                               Γ
(21) nPV(t)0
sld*  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α –π +µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–{µ (1–t)–π }u du
                            0                                     0
(1–t)A0     tC{1–e
–{µ (1–t)–π }Γ }
                 =  —————— + ———————
             α –π +µ (1–t)        {µ (1–t)–π }Γ
where the current investment cost at time u is Ce
π u.
The difference between nPV(t)0
sld and nPV(t)0
sld* is defined as the present value of
additional corporate tax burden (inflation losses) at time 0 (ATB0
sld), which is caused by
the fictitious profit. With the critical tax-life of a capital good Γ *, therefore
            1–e
–{µ (1–t)–π }Γ *       1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ *
(22) ATB(Γ *)0
sld   =  tC[—————— – ——————]  =   tC(FP0
sld)
       {µ (1–t) –π }Γ *    µ (1–t)Γ *
where FP0
sld indicates the present value of fictitious profit per monetary unit at time 0 in
the case of adopting straight-line depreciation.
In order to examine whether and to what extent generous tax depreciation provisions
promote private investments in inflationary situations, the value FP0
sld (with Γ *) can be
adopted as the benchmark. When the amount of annual depreciation expense is calculated
on the basis of historical cost as is the case in practice, the incentive effect of geometric-
degressive depreciation on private investment in an inflationary phase can be measured
(23) nPV(t)0
gdd – nPV(t, Γ *)0
sld
                                                            
assets that increased in price” (Evans, 1983, p.150).10
        δ           1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ *
=  tC[—————– – ——————]  =  tC(IE0
gdd)
             δ +µ (1–t)             µ (1–t)Γ *
where nPV(t)0
gdd is the nominal present value of asset with geometric-degressive
depreciation at time 0.
With accelerated depreciation,
(24) nPV(t)0
ad – nPV(t, Γ *)0
sld
              σ {1–e
–µ (1–t)}        e
–µ (1–t)Γ * – e
–µ (1–t)Ω *
=  tC [—————— + ———————]  =  tC(IE0
ad)
                 µ (1–t)                    µ (1–t)Γ *
where nPV(t)0
ad is the nominal present value of asset with accelerated depreciation at time
0 and Ω * denotes the reduced tax-life of a capital good, when Γ  = Γ *.
When investment tax allowance is adopted and the tax-life of a capital good is Γ *,
(25) nPV(t)0
ita – nPV(t, Γ *)0
sld
   β {1–e
–µ (1–t)}
=  tC[——————]=  tC(IE0
ita)
                µ (1–t)
where nPV(t)0
ita is the nominal present value of asset with investment tax allowance at
time 0.
Subsequently, generous tax depreciation measures simply compensate the inflation
losses in full-scale, when
(26) IE0
gdd  =  FP0
sld
(27) IE0
ad  =  FP0
sld
(28) IE0
ita  =  FP0
sld   .
In spite of inflation, tax depreciation rules shown above guarantee investment promotion
effects, when the individual IE values (IE0
gdd, IE0
ad and IE0
ita) are greater than FP0
sld.11
V. International Comparison of Effects of Tax Incentive System on
Equipment Investment
Table 1 compares the highest corporate tax rate (for retained earnings), tax depreciation
methods and the extent of their generosity, which are presently allowed in the context of
tax law in seven selected OECD countries. In the international ranking of the statutory
corporate tax rate, Spain ranks first at 35%, followed by Austria (34%) and France
(33.33%). The corporate tax rate is the lowest in Germany (25%). In Japan only the
straight-line depreciation method can be adopted for equipment. As mentioned above, in
countries like France, Spain and Sweden geometric-degressive depreciation is primarily
applied as the investment incentive scheme for equipment, of which, however, the rate
ranges from 20% (Germany
8) to 35% (France). Furthermore, accelerated depreciation can
be combined with straight-line depreciation in Finland, while Austrian tax law provides a
possibility of adopting investment tax allowance together with straight-line depreciation.
The normal tax-life for equipment amounts to 10 years in these selected countries.
According to the net present value calculated under the standard assumptions for the case
of investing in equipment (i.e. A0 = 100, r = 4%, α  = 20%, C = 416.7), the Austrian tax
incentives guarantee the most favourable conditions for the investors in the case of
ignoring the impact of anticipated inflation (see also Table 1). In descending order,
Finland, France, Spain and Sweden also provide investment incentives, of which the
extent, however, does not reach the NPV level in Austria. On the other hand, Japan and
German corporate tax systems remain more or less tax-neutral, since NPV reaches
approximately zero in these countries. In this case one can presume that the adopted 10-
year tax life largely corresponds to the critical asset life.
9
In spite of inflation, investment incentive effects can be guaranteed in Austria (under
the given assumptions for other relevant parameters), when IE0
ita (the difference between
nominal present value per monetary unit at the year of investment with investment tax
allowance and that with straight-line depreciation) exceeds FP0
sld (the nominal present
value of fictitious profit per monetary unit at the same year in the case of adopting straight-
line depreciation). According to the model simulation summarised in Table 2, the current
Austrian tax incentive system no longer stimulates private investment in equipment and
remains neutral when, ceteris paribus, the inflation rate reaches slightly over 2% in this
                    
8  A movement to the straight-line depreciation is allowed in Germany.
9  Under the given assumptions made for the calculation, the net present value with Γ  = 10 changes
marginally from –0.6 to –0.3, when the corporate tax rate increases from 25% to 70%. In many other
similar studies the critical asset-life (Γ *) is (sometimes implicitly) assumed to be around 10 years for
equipment (see also Sinn, Leibfritz and Weichenrieder, 1999, Leibfritz and Meuerer, 1985; Bordignon,
Giannini and Panteghini, 1999).12
country. With this so-called critical inflation rate, the incentive system can ‘only’ fully
compensate the inflation losses. On the other hand, the Finnish system appears to be more
robust against inflation, thanks to the low tax rate: its accelerated depreciation combined
with the relatively low corporate tax rate provides incentives until the inflation rate reaches
around 4.0%. Regardless of the various corporate tax rates applied in France, Spain and
Sweden, the geometric-degressive depreciation rule in these countries with an inflation
rate of approximately 1.5% does not provide the investment promotion effect any more
and solely functions as a sort of compensation measure of the inflation losses.
Table 1
International comparison of tax incentives measured in terms of net present value
without inflation: investment in equipment with the tax-life of 10 years
Country Statutory
corporate tax rate
for retained
earnings (%)
Tax depreciation and investment promotion
measures
Net present value
(= PV(t)0 with various
depreciation rules – C)
Japan
Germany
Finland
Austria
France
Sweden
Spain
30
25
28
34
33.33
28
35
Straight-line depreciation (10%)
Geometric-degressive depreciation (20%)
Accelerated depreciation (50%) + straight-
line depreciation (10%)
Investment tax allowance (9%) + straight-
line depreciation (10%)
Geometric-degressive depreciation (35%)
Geometric-degressive depreciation (30%)
Geometric-degressive depreciation (30%)
– 0.6
0.0
9.8
11.9
6.5
4.5
5.1
Common
assumptions
C = PV0  = 416.7; A0 = 100; r =4%; α  = 20%; 0 < u < ∞
Sources: Genser and Haufler (1999), Harmonisation of Corporate Income Taxation in the EU, Mennel and
Förster (2000), Steuern in Europa, Amerika und Asien; Own calculations13
Table 2
International comparison of investment promotion effect of tax depreciation rules in inflationary phases measured in terms of
nominal net present value
Japan Austria France Finland Sweden Spain Inflation rate %
tC (FP0
sld) tC (IE0 with various depreciation rules – FP0
sld)
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
–2.6            
–5.1            
–7.6            
–10.1            
–12.6            
–15.0            
–17.4            
–19.8            
–22.2            
–24.5            
–26.8            
–29.1            
–31.3            
–33.6            
9.6            
6.7            
3.7            
0.8            
–2.0            
–4.9            
–7.7            
–10.5            
–13.3            
–16.0            
–18.7            
–21.5            
–24.1            
–26.8            
5.0            
2.9            
0.8            
–1.2            
–3.3            
–5.4            
–7.4            
–9.5            
–11.6            
–13.6            
–15.6            
–17.7            
–19.7            
–21.8            
9.2            
7.9            
6.7            
5.4            
4.2            
2.9            
1.7            
0.4            
–0.9            
–2.1            
–3.4            
–4.7            
–5.9            
–7.2            
3.2            
1.4            
–0.4            
–2.1            
–3.9            
–5.7            
–7.4            
–9.1            
–10.8            
–12.5            
–14.2            
–15.9            
–17.5            
–19.2            
3.4            
1.0            
–1.4            
–3.8            
–6.1            
–8.5            
–10.8            
–13.1            
–15.5            
–17.8            
–20.1            
–22.4            
–24.7            
–27.0            
Specific assumptions t=30%; Γ =10 years t=34%; β =9% t= 33.33%; δ =35% t=28%; σ =50% t=28%; δ =30% t=35%; δ =30%
Common assumptions C=PV0 = 416.7; A0=100; r=4%; α =20%; Γ =Γ * =10 years and 0 < u < ∞
Source: Table 1 and own calculations14
VII. Conclusion
When calculating tax profits, depreciation is deducted from a gross stream of return
generated from an asset. From the point of view of the competitive firm which tries to
maximise profits, this study compares — on the basis of net present value models and
their simulation — incentive effects of various tax depreciation methods. For the purpose
of international comparison, seven OECD countries are investigated — Japan, Germany,
Austria, Finland, France, Spain and Sweden.
In an specific economic situation with r = 4%, α  = 20%, Japanese and German
corporate tax systems remain more or less tax-neutral with the tax-life of around 10 years
and δ  = 20%, when there is no inflation. In such a benchmark case one can presume that
the assumed 10-year tax-life largely corresponds to the critical asset life. By contrast,
Austria’s investment tax allowance provides — in combination with the corporate tax rate
of 34% — the most favourable conditions for investors among the investigated countries,
followed by Finland, France, Spain and Sweden. However, even the Austrian system loses
its incentive effect when the inflation rate is slightly over 2%. The Finnish system with
accelerated depreciation and the lower corporate tax rate (28%) seems to be a more
appropriate one when a country has a higher inflation rate. In the countries with rather
generous geometric-degressive depreciation (Spain, France and Sweden), private investors
can expect tax incentives only when the inflation rate remains marginal.
Apart from the systematic comparison of the net present value approach and its major
outcomes with the cost of capital or marginal effective rate methodology that is often used
in the similar context (Chennells and Griffith, 1997), further research appears to be
necessary to examine the sensitivity caused by the changes in selected parameters
(including interest rate
10) as well as to adequately consider other nation-specific factors
like differences in local corporate income taxes in the calculation, which are quite
significant in a number of countries investigated.
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